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The West Africa Civil Society Institute (WACSI) was created by the Open Society Initiative for 
West Africa (OSIWA) to reinforce the capacities of civil society in the region. The Institute was 
established to bridge the institutional and operational gaps within civil society.
The World Federalist Movement- Institute for Global 
Policy (WFM-IGP) is an international citizen’s 
movement working for justice, peace, and sustainable 
prosperity located in New York, U.S.A. We call for an 
end to the rule of force, through a world governed by 
law, based on strengthened and democratised world 
institutions. World federalists support the creation of 
global democratic structures accountable to the citizens 
of the world and call for the division of international 
authority among separate agencies. World federalists 
believe that all people have the fundamental right to 
self-government. Because of their scope, some policy 
matters fall under the authority of local governments 
while others fall under the jurisdiction of national 
governments or international institutions.
www.wfm.org
The Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) 
was created in December 2000 as part of the world 
network of 32 autonomous foundations founded and 
supported by George Soros. These non-profit-making 
foundations share in the commitment to work for an 
“open society”. Based on the principle that no one has 
monopoly of the truth, an open society recognises 
the different points of view and always remains open 
to improvements. In practice, open societies are 
characterised by the priority of law, democracy, respect 
of diversity and human rights, liberalisation of markets, 
information to the people and the dynamism of civil 
society.
www.osiwa.org
The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) is committed to 
the concepts and basic values of social justice, political 
participation and the labour movement. FES is a 
non-governmental and non-profit making Political 
Foundation based in over 100 countries throughout 
the world. The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung was established 
in Accra, Ghana in 1969.  The objectives of FES are to 
promote the democratisation process and to encourage 
socio-economic dialogue. To this end, we are currently 
running programmes and activities with our partners, 
such as Non-Governmental Organisations, Trade 







To strengthen civil society organisations as strategic 
partners for the promotion democracy, good 
governance and national development in the sub 
region.
Mission
The objective of the Institute is to strengthen the 
institutional and technical capacities of CSOs in 
the formulation of policies, the implementation and 
promotion of democratic values and principles in West 
Africa. The role of WACSI is to serve as a resource 
centre for training, research, experience sharing and 
political dialogue for CSOs in West Africa. The 
Institute makes its plea through policy dialogue to 
discuss current issues affecting West African States. 
Reference documents are regularly published by the 




The West Africa Civil Society Institute (WACSI) in collaboration with the World Federalist Movement- the Institute for 
Global Policy (WFM-IGP) with the support of the 
Open Society Initiative of West Africa (OSIWA) 
and Fredrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) hosted a regional 
policy roundtable for civil society titled “Global 
Consultative Roundtables on the Responsibility to 
Protect: West African Perspectives” in Accra, Ghana, 
from 30-31 July, 2008. 
The roundtable was the seventh in a series of 
consultations organised to build a global Non-
Governmental Organisation (NGO) network on the 
responsibility to protect (R2P) norm. The roundtable 
group comprised about 46 participants from NGOs, 
Community Based Organisations (CBOs), and sub-
regional civil society networks. Representatives from 
national governments and intergovernmental agencies 
also participated in the consultation. The goal of 
the roundtable was to discuss and deliberate on the 
progress of implementing R2P and its implications 
in West Africa. 
The consultation reviewed and analysed ongoing 
initiatives by the African Union (AU), the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
national governments and civil society to protect 
citizens from genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and ethnic cleansing. Specifically, the 
consultation reviewed the ongoing processes by the 
ECOWAS to regionalise protection and security as 
enshrined in key instruments such as the ECOWAS 
1993 Revised Treaty of ECOWAS, 1999 Protocol 
Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and 
Security known as The Mechanism; and the 2001 
Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good 
Governance. More significantly, the consultation 
examined the recently adopted ECOWAS Conflict 
Prevention Framework which refers to the key 
components of R2P, i.e. the responsibility to Prevent, 
React and Rebuild as central to regional peace and 
security. 
The consultation also discussed the possibility of 
building a network of CSOs in the sub-region to 
promote the R2P norm. It also sought to harmonise 
parallel civil society initiatives and processes on 
R2P related interventions by exploring avenues for 
collaboration at national, regional and international 
levels.
This policy paper outlines the key themes discussed at 
the Accra consultation and proffers recommendations 
for future interventions on R2P in West Africa. 
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In the wake of the international community’s failure to protect civilians against atrocities in Rwanda, Kosovo and Bosnia, the former UN 
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan challenged members 
of the UN to uphold the principles of the Charter 
establishing the organisation and to act to prevent 
similar atrocities from occurring.
The “Responsibility to Protect” principle emerged as a 
response to this challenge. In 2001, the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) report laid down convincing arguments that 
sovereign states and the international community 
have the responsibility to intervene to protect civilians 
at risk of grave human rights violations, to rebuild 
war affected societies and to prevent severe violations 
and deadly conflicts. Focusing on the “responsibility 
to protect”, and not the “right to intervene”, the 
Commission outlined a framework for international 
actors to intervene when a state fails to live up to the 
responsibility to protect its citizens. 
This framework comprises of three specif ic 
responsibilities:
The responsibility to prevent – addressing root •	
causes and direct causes of internal conflict and 
other man-made crises that  put populations at 
risk;
The responsibility to react – responding to •	
situations using coercive measures like sanctions, 
international persecution and military intervention 
where necessary;
The responsibility to rebuild – providing assistance •	
with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, 
and addressing the causes of the harm, the 
intervention was designed to halt or avert.
The Commission’s report was well received by the 
international community and the recommendations 
were highlighted in the United Nations (UN) High-
level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. 
Subsequently, the former UN Secretary General, 
Kofi Annan endorsed the recommendations through 
his call for collective security in his report, “In 
Larger Freedom”. The principle gained international 
legitimacy when the Heads of State and Governments 
adopted it in the outcome document of the World 
Summit in 2005. 
By adopting the principle, the international 
community and the UN emphasised two fundamental 
principles: that part of the responsibility of sovereign 
states was to protect its citizens from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity 
and that the international community through 
the UN has the responsibility to use appropriate 
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means 
to protect populations from the above mentioned 
atrocities. Furthermore, where peaceful/ diplomatic 
measures fail, the international community through 
the Security Council has the responsibility to use 
“collective action” to protect populations from 
atrocities. 
Context
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However, implementing the norm has been proving 
difficult. There have been criticisms from many 
countries in the global south that the norm is a 
camouflage for powerful countries to intervene in the 
affairs of weaker states. In spite of these challenges, 
there have been several important normative 
advancements on R2P including the Security 
Council’s unanimous adoption of Resolution 1674 
on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict; 
the Secretary-General’s appointments of Mr. Francis 
Deng as Special Adviser on the Prevention of 
Genocide and Mr. Edward Luck as Special Adviser 
to the Secretary General with a focus on the R2P. 
Three years since the World Summit, it has been difficult to attain global consensus on where and when to use R2P, particularly at 
the UN’s Security Council; which has to sanction 
the application of R2P in a given context. Many 
commentators believe that the crises in Myanmar, 
Darfur and now Zimbabwe qualify as R2P cases. 
However a divided Security Council with members 
split along political and economic interests have made 
it impossible for any of these cases to be analysed 
within the R2P framework. 
In addition, there has been an upsurge in the number 
of governments seeking to undermine the concept of 
the R2P, arguing that the Summit rejected the High-
level Panel’s report on the concept of R2P. Other 
governments claim to be generally supportive, but 
are quietly working to erode the doctrine’s value. The 
opposition to R2P is rooted in the notion that state 
sovereignty is supreme. Opponents of the norm want 
to curb what is perceived as a western ideology.
In recent conflicts in Africa, such as Zimbabwe, 
Kenya and Sudan, R2P has been cited as an avenue 
for the international community’s intervention. 
This has not gained much traction for a number 
of reasons ranging from lack of awareness of the 
norm, to absence of political will to apply the norm. 
Governments in Africa have expressed support for 
R2P to varying degrees. Whereas some countries, 
including Benin, Rwanda, and Tanzania have all 
given strong and explicit support for  the norm, other 
countries, including Algeria, Egypt, and Sudan, are 
yet to embrace the concept. 
Globally, awareness of the norm among civil society 
is low. In response to this, WFM-IGP, Oxfam 
International, Human Rights Watch (HRW), and 
the International Crisis Group (ICG) have taken 
the lead in R2P activism. Additionally, the Global 
Centre on R2P established in New York is to serve 
as a research and advocacy initiative to promote 
the universal acceptance and effective operational 
implementation of the R2P norm.
The Struggle to make R2P a Reality
From Left: Nana Asantewaa Afadzinu, Open Society Initiative for West 
Africa, Abuja, Nigeria; William Pace, World  Federalist Movement, New York, 
USA; Commandant General Attipoe, Commandant, Kofi Annan International 
Peacekeeping Training Centre, Accra, Ghana
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It is indubitable that Africa is in need of a comprehensive approach to protecting civilians from crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
The Rwandan genocide led to a global moral 
commitment that “never again” will the world stand 
by and watch similar atrocities occur. But this moral 
commitment has not translated into action. 
Concurrent to the ICISS conceptualisation of The 
Responsibility to Protect; African governments were 
deliberating on the need to restructure the continent’s 
multilateral institutions in order to improve their 
efficacy. This process was engendered by recognition 
that the erstwhile Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) was considered to have been ineffective in 
its response to human rights and humanitarian crises 
within member states. In addition, member states 
also came to the realisation that the continent’s peace 
and security challenges were not given due attention 
and prioritisation at the international level. 
Thus the Constitutive Act of the AU adopted a version 
of R2P by giving the Union 
the “right to intervene” in 
a member state pursuant to 
a decision of the Assembly 
i n  r e spec t  o f  “g rave 
circumstances, namely 
war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity”. 
The AU’s approach of 
“non indifference” was 
stressed in the “Ezulwini 
consensus” which was the 
outcome of a meeting of 
AU Foreign Ministers in 
response to the UN High 
Level Panel’s report. Significantly, the “Ezulwini 
Consensus” expressed support for the responsibility 
to protect doctrine.
Support for the principles of R2P can also be found 
in the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the 
AU. This institutional mechanism aims to enhance 
the AU’s role in the prevention, management and 
resolution of conflicts. Though the Constitutive Act 
does not mention the responsibility to protect, the 
PSC through its subsidiary structures such as the 
Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the 
Panel of the Wise, and the Africa Standby Force, 
and the AU’s policy of Post Conflict Reconstruction 
and Development (PCRD), provides a foundation for 
implementing the three components of R2P in Africa. 
Nevertheless, the policy consultation expounded 
on current and potential challenges facing the AU’s 
implementation of R2P. These include capacity and 
institutional deficits within the continental body and 
its various sub entities. Inherent to these challenges 
are: difficulties in holding Member States to their 
commitments; severe bureaucracy in the institution 
limiting quick decision making; and, African citizens 
ignorance of the Institution and how it functions 
resulting in citizens inability to hold governments 
accountable. 
Responsibility to Protect in Africa: an Analysis of AU’s 
Peace and Security Architecture
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Regional Responsibility to Prevent: An Analysis of the 
ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework
ECOWAS has been at the forefront of promoting a regional approach to addressing issues of peace and security in the region. The institution has 
designed structures, protocols and instruments to assist 
it in achieving this goal. These include the ECOWAS 
Commission, the Community Parliament and Court of 
Justice. Within the ECOWAS Commission, there are a 
number of Commissions focused on the issue of peace 
and security and the protection of civilians; e.g. The 
Commission for Political Affairs Peace and Security 
which consists of the Early Warning and Observation 
Centre, and the unit on Peacekeeping, and Security. 
There is also the Commission on Human Development 
and Gender.
Furthermore, in January 2008, ECOWAS Heads 
of States and Governments adopted the ECOWAS 
Conf lict Prevention Framework (ECPF). This 
progressive framework seeks to:
Mainstream conflict prevention into ECOWAS’ •	
policies and programmes; 
Strengthen capacity within ECOWAS to pursue •	
concrete and integrated conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding initiatives through ECOWAS 
institutions including the Council of the Wise and 
Special Mediators; 
Strengthen awareness, capacity and anticipation •	
within member states and civil society as principal 
constituencies and actors in conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding.
In the ECPF it is clearly outlined that ECOWAS •	
has been imbued with necessary “supranational” 
powers to act on behalf of and in conjunction with 
member states, the AU and the UN to protect 
human security in three distinct ways, namely:
The Responsibility to Prevent: Which involves •	
actions taken to address the direct and root 
causes of intra and inter state conflicts that put 
populations at risk;
The Responsibility to React: Which are actions •	
taken in response to grave and compelling 
humanitarian disasters;
The Responsibility to Rebuild: Which are •	
actions taken to ensure recovery, reconstruction, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction in the aftermath 
of violent conflicts, humanitarian and natural 
disasters. 
These “responsibilities” outlined in the ECPF are 
similar if not almost identical to those espoused in the 
R2P.
The ECPF conveys an essential shift in ECOWAS’ 
approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding 
to the extent that there will be more coordination 
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Civil Society and Conflict Early Warning and 
Response and R2P in West Africa
Building a Regional Standby Force
One of the key areas covered within the ECPF is Conflict Early Warning and Response. The objective of the Early Warning component 
is to gather and process conflict-inducing and peace-
enhancement data in a participative manner with the 
view to informing the actions of ECOWAS, member 
states and civil society to diffuse or eliminate potential 
sources of conflict aggravation and strengthen the peace 
fabric within the Community. This will be implemented 
through the ECOWAS Conflict Early Warning and 
Response mechanism (ECOWARN). The utility of 
the ECOWARN enabled ECOWAS apply the R2P 
principle to intervene in conflict situations in some parts 
of the region. These areas include:
The peaceful resolution of the standoff between •	
the governments of The Gambia and Senegal in 
2006;
The establ ishment of a memorandum of •	
understanding among political parties in The 
Gambia in time for the presidential elections in 2006; 
The mitigation of the crisis in Guinea Conakry •	
in January 2007 that resulted in the death of 
civilians.
A unique collaboration exists between ECOWAS and 
civil society in the implementation of the ECOWARN. 
The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding’s (WANEP) 
partnership with ECOWAS establishes a common 
platform to coordinate responses to volatile situations 
by   ECOWAS and civil society. The ECOWARN 
structure could be a valuable tool to inform the work 
of the NGO Coalition for R2P in West Africa.
among ECOWAS institutions and agencies on conflict 
prevention. In addition, the framework provides the 
space for civil society and non-state actors to collaborate 
with ECOWAS to undertake conflict prevention, 
management and resolution initiatives.  However, a 
major challenge is to generate political will to apply and 
implement the framework.
The existence of a functional “Standby Force” is critical to Africa’s ability to fulf il its responsibility to react under the ambit of 
R2P. The AU is in the process of enhancing its peace 
and security architecture by establishing an African 
Standby Force (ASF) capable of rapid deployment to 
keep or enforce the peace by 2010. 
The specific objectives of this force is to conduct 
and observe peacekeeping missions, intervene in 
member states when their internal security is gravely 
threatened, conduct preventive deployments where 
such security threats loom in the horizon, conduct 
post-conflict peacebuilding operations, including 
disarming and demobilising warring militias, provide 
humanitarian assistance in conflict and disaster areas, 
and perform such other functions as the PSC may 
authorise. The objectives embrace the AU doctrine 
on R2P, which includes all the above numerated 
actions in addition to promoting and encouraging 
democratic practices, good governance, and the rule 
of law.
The ASF would comprise of standby brigades in 
each of the five regions, and incorporate a police 
and civilian expert capacity. The West African 
sub region has vast experience in regional forces 
intervening in conflict situations under the auspices 
of “humanitarian interventions”. The ECOWAS 
Monitoring Group’s (ECOMOG) involvement in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone are such examples. 
The ECOWAS Standby Force or Brigade (ECOBRIG), 
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as one of the pillars of the ASF has made considerable 
progress in terms of recruitment and training of the 
force. It is expected that ECOBRIG is on course to 
have the 6, 500 strong force ready for deployment by 
the 2010 deadline. 
However, lessons from past peacekeeping experiences 
such as the Africa Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) 
which lacked adequate training for personnel and weak 
operational capacity requires that the ECOBRIG and 
the eventual ASF have clear mandates for deployment 
with defined exit strategies. Furthermore, African 
governments should ensure that collective action at 
regional or continental levels are supported by visible 
political will and requisite resources.
Engendering Peace and Security in West Africa
The negative impact of armed conf lict on women and girls and gender based violence in conf lict situations has increasingly 
become a humanitarian challenge across Africa. The 
recurrent use of rape as a weapon of war resulted in 
its recognition as a war crime by the United Nations 
International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR). 
Notwithstanding, gender based forms of violence 
against women and girls is not abating. Furthermore, 
women have traditionally been excluded from formal 
decision making processes on peace and security. 
The Responsibi l it y to protect doctr ine as 
conceptualised by ICISS was also accused of being 
gender blind and not taking into consideration the 
gendered interpretations of concepts like “security” 
and “protection”. Therefore, any attempt to 
implement R2P in West Africa has to pay attention to 
international instruments such as the United Nations 
Resolution 132, the Protocol to the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa and the ECOWAS gender policy. 
The regional implementation of R2P also has to take 
cognisance of the ongoing peacebuilding initiatives 
by women’s groups such as Femme Afrique Solidarite 
(FAS), Women Peace and Security Network 
(WIPSEN-AFRICA), Mano River Women’s Peace 
Network (MARWOPNET), Liberian Women’s 
Initiative (LWI), and the Women in Peacebuilding 
Network (WIPNET).
Protecting Human Rights in West Africa
The process of safeguarding human rights is at the crux of the protection under R2P. There is general acceptance of the concept of 
human rights protection among governments and 
civil society actors in West Africa.  Most West African 
countries are signatories to international conventions 
advocating for the protection of the rights of citizens. 
At the heart of these conventions is an imposition of 
responsibility on states to ensure that the rights of 
citizens, irrespective of creed, gender and ethnicity, 
are protected. Thus, R2P principles are inherent 
in most national and international human rights 
conventions and statutes in Africa, the challenge; 
however, has been the translation of these principles 
into practice. 
In West Africa, human rights institutions face the 
following practical challenges as they seek to exercise 
their responsibility to protect: 
Government agencies often question the mandate of •	
adjudication processes of human rights institutions 
when state practices are being scrutinised;
Lack of support for human rights institutions by •	
governments has diminished the ability of these 
institutions to deliver on their mandate;
The prevailing practice of constituting human •	
rights institutions with only attorneys or legal 
professionals limits the protection of rights to a 
few players;
There is insufficient understanding of the concept •	
of administrative justice within the sub region. 
Community citizens are not well versed with 
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Promoting Citizens 
Participation in Fighting Corruption
the differences between adjudication within 
administrative agencies and adjudication in courts 
of law. This has limited potential applicants’ 
opportunities to seek the requisite redress for 
abuses they may have suffered;
In certain jurisdictions, court decisions have had •	
the effect of limiting or narrowing interpretations 
of the mandate of human rights institutions. This 
situation has diminished the ability of some human 
rights institutions to assert their mandate. Also, 
institutions charged with the responsibility to 
protect the rights of citizens have been accused of 
engaging in corrupt practices.
The perennial challenge within human rights 
institutions in the region is inadequate financial 
and technical capacity which hinders efficiency 
and weakens the mechanisms needed to protect 
community citizens. 
The Accra consultation discussed corruption as one of the debilitating factors that contribute to instability in West Africa. Corruption 
permeates the fabric of society and institutional 
frameworks of governments. While the levels of 
corruption vary from country to country, the political 
and social conditions in the region as a whole provide 
an ideal environment for its spread. 
A number of common factors have facilitated this 
spread of corruption: the legacy of colonialism; the 
influence of the colonial powers after independence; 
the deterioration of economic conditions; the 
existence of social schisms; and inequality. Therefore 
discussions on implementing R2P in West Africa 
should analyse strategies for addressing this endemic 
governance challenge. The consultation acknowledged 
that while corruption may not be an issue in the 
global implementation of R2P. It is of vital concern 
in the West African context. 
Efforts are ongoing in the region to fight corruption. 
These include the adoption of the ECOWAS Protocol 
on the fight against Corruption which was signed in 
December 2001, though it has not yet entered into 
force.  
The ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good 
Governance under the section on the rule of law, 
human rights and good governance admonish 
member states to fight corruption and mange their 
national resources in a transparent manner, ensuring 
that they are equitably distributed. However, the 
real challenge to addressing the problem lies at the 
national level. Though there are laudable examples 
of the establishment of national anti corruption 
institutions and commissions, in many cases the 
perceptions of these institutions are that their 
activities are politically motivated. Conversely, 
where they confront apparent corruption within state 
structures, they are discredited by the state.  
Therefore, the active role of civil society in addressing 
this persisting challenge in the region should be 
enhanced. 
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A Review of 
Ghana’s Architecture for Peace
The presentations and discussions at the regional policy consultation on “Global Consultative Roundtables on the Responsibility to Protect: 
West African Perspectives” raised a number of issues 
that need to be addressed by policy makers including 
civil society, ECOWAS, the international community 
and the UN. 
Eleven key recommendations emerged from the 
consultation:
Civil Society
Civil society in West Africa needs to become 1. 
more engaged in the global advocacy on R2P. 
Across West Africa, national governments are realising the importance of institutionalising crisis prevention. A good example is Ghana’s 
Architecture for Peace. Though Ghana is considered 
as a relatively peaceful and stable country, the 
intermittent ethnic conflicts in north of the country 
and the experiences of civil wars in other West 
African countries have led the government to take 
proactive steps to prevent and respond to potentially 
volatile situations.  Ghana’s architecture of peace is 
a framework that aims to enable and facilitate the 
development of mechanisms for cooperation among 
all the relevant stakeholders in peacebuilding by 
promoting cooperative problem solving approaches to 
conflict prevention. The specific objectives of Ghana’s 
peace strategy are, to harmonise peacebuilding 
activities through networking and coordination; to 
strengthen the capacity of peacebuilding institutions 
and practitioners; to increase awareness of the use of 
non-violent strategies in responding to conflicts in 
Ghana and to build the capacity of chiefs, women and 
youth groups, civil society, community organisations, 
public institutions and other groups to participate 
meaningfully in promoting and maintaining peace 
in the country.
However, the lack of resources to operationalise the 
peace plan is a major challenge.  Also, operationalising 
the peace plan requires parliament’s ratification. 
Ghana’s parliament is yet to ratify the National 
Architecture for Peace.
Policy Recommendations
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A regional coalition on R2P should be formed 
with a functional secretariat to coordinate and 
harmonise the activities of members of the network 
in order to operationalise R2P in West Africa 
Civil society should lead a rigorous process to 2. 
popularise the norm in West Africa. Close alliances 
should be formed with national governments and 
ECOWAS to work on key R2P related issues. 
Civil society should embark on targeted lobbying 3. 
and advocacy campaigns with appropriate 
nat iona l  parl iaments and the ECOWAS 
parliament to galvanise political will to secure 
support for the implementation of the norm. 
It is signif icant for civil society actors and 4. 
general supporters of the norm to advocate 
for the creation of a reporting mechanism 
o n  t h e  i mp l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  R 2 P 
Measures must be taken to build the capacity of 5. 
the media to promote R2P issues.
 
ECOWAS
The R2P norm should be linked to existing 6. 
traditional norms and regional conventions and 
protocols to highlight that the norm is not a 
new concept. This will remove the perception 
that the R2P norm is a Western ideology. 
There is the need for ECOWAS to take advantage of the 7. 
R2P norm to popularise the ECPF in the sub-region 
International Community/ United Nations
T he  i n t e r na t iona l  com mu n i t y  shou ld 8. 
demonstrate a commitment to provide financial 
resources to support the implementation of 
the ECPF, R2P, the establishment of ASF 
and the strengthening of the ECOMOG. 
The recently established Global Centre for R2P 9. 
should prioritise highlighting the concerns 
of A fr icans in implement ing the norm. 
There is the need to harmonise African 10. 
perspectives on R2P, by creating platforms for 
exchange between different regions on the continent. 
African CSOs should be given opportunities 11. 
to present and participate in debates on R2P at 
key forums such as General Assembly and Security 
Council debates. 
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NO. NAME ORGANISATION/ INSTITUTION
1 DR. NANA PRATT Mano River Women’s Peace Network (MARWOPNET)
2 MAJ. GEN. J. K. ATTIPOE Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC)
3 DR. KWESI ANING Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC)
4 SAMUEL ATUOBI Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC)
5 NANCY ANNAN Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC)
6 LEVINIA ADDAE-MENSAH Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC)
7 LEYMAH GBOWEE Women Peace and Security Network –Africa (WIPSEN-AFRICA)
8 VON KEMEDI Bayelsa State Government
9 DR. I.S. ZABADI West African Network on Security and Democratic Governance (WANSED)
10 JULIE SANDA West African Network on Security and Democratic Governance (WANSED)
11 VOKE IGHORODJE Centre  for Democracy and Development (CDD)
12 THEODORA W. ANTI Foundation for Security and Development in Africa (FOSDA)
13 WILLIAM PACE World Federalist Movement (WFM)
14 SAPNA CHHATPAR World Federalist Movement (WFM)
15 MARION ARNAUD World Federalist Movement (WFM)
16 MURTALA TOURAY West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP)
17 FRANK B. DANKWA Ghana Association of Private Voluntary Organisations in Development (GAPVOD)
18 DR. OSHITA O. OSHITA Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR)
19 GEN. A. QUAINOO Centre for Conflict Resolution (CENCOR)
20 GBODUI AFI DOVI National Coalition Of Civil Society Organisations (CNSC)
21 OSMAN DAMBA TAHIDU Pan African Organisation for Sustainable Development (POSDEV)
22 NANA AFADZINU Open Society Initiative of West Africa (OSIWA)
23 P. K. OPOKU-MENSAH National Peace Council
24 NDEYE ROSALIE LO Femme Afrique Solidarite (FAS)
25 MALCOLM JOSEPH Centre for Media Studies and Peacebuilding (CEMSP)
26 PROF. OUMAR NDONGO West African Civil Society Forum (WACSOF)
27 FAUSTINA ESSANDOH Institute of Local Government Studies (ILGS)
28 MAJ. GEN. CARL COLEMAN African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR)
29 NICOLE DELLER Global Centre For R2P
30 NAFI CHINERY African Women’s Development Fund (AWDF)
31 HAWA MUHAMMAD African Women’s Development Fund (AWDF)
32 PROF KEN ATTAFUAH Justice and Human Rights Institute (JHRI)
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